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Despite the tremendous growth of mobile services in most developing countries, these have largely 
remained limited to urban areas. This has further aggravated the existing urban and rural divide. 
Policy makers and regulators perceive the need for an effective regulatory and policy environment to 
reduce the gap, as there are several market challenges in this endeavor, including low commercial 
viability. However, most such interventions have had little success.  
This paper outlines India’s experience of increasing rural teledensity, including its recent policy 
initiative to increase penetration through creation of a Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) 
that supported a variety of innovative initiatives. USOF’s most ambitious program to date had been 
the design and deployment of mobile services in rural areas. 
This paper analyses the outcomes of various programs, especially those of the mobile service 
provision component of USOF. Despite the innovative design of the USOF program, it had little 
impact on increasing rural teledensity. On the other hand, positive policy steps that reduced the costs 
for service provision (revenue shares, duties, ADC) and competition facilitated greater rural 
penetration. This raises the issue of role of government vis-à-vis private sector in increasing rural 
teledensities.  
The lack of accountability arising from the relationship between the government owned incumbent 
and the USOF administrator and proper evaluation of USOF, the non-ring fencing of the fund and 
poor quality project management contributed to the low impact. Non-involvement of private operators 
at an early stage, inability to suitably enforce any penalties for violation of contracts, and non-
existent review and feedback mechanism have not allowed USOF to leverage the benefits of an early 
start.  In Peru, strict penalties in non implementation of contracts led to more timely schedules 
(Cannock, 2001). 
Since USOF is a highly visible program, it is important to generate high impact outcomes.  On the 
strategic front, USOF needs to be managed by an independent body that is made responsible for 
outcomes. Third party assessments and greater enforceability of contracts are necessary operational 
elements of this design. Without this operational framework, the strategic elements of design will not 
provide the value that was envisaged. 
This paper also provides a framework for assessment of USOF and relates it to the experience in 
other countries. USOF must be treated as one among many instruments for increasing rural 
teledensities and efforts should be made to facilitate policy outcomes on a variety of dimensions. 
Keywords: Rural Telecom, Universal Access, Universal Service, Universal Service Obligation Fund, 
Viability Gap Funding, Rural Teledensity 
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Role of Universal Service Obligation Fund in Rural Telecom Services:  
Lessons from the Indian Experience 
 
 Introduction 
The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) of India’s most ambitious scheme to date 
had been the provision of mobile services in 84 clusters covering 500 out of a total of nearly 
625 districts through private participation. Under this scheme, mobile infrastructure and 
services were to be provided separately through two bidding processes. However, a recent 
review (TRAI 2008) revealed that despite what was considered an innovative design, rural 
telecom services (RTS) under this scheme had not taken off. In the meantime, rural 
teledensities (RTD) had increased faster than in previous years. This led to concerns 
regarding the efficacy of government intervention in deploying USOF. On the other hand, in 
this context, the role of markets in helping rural telecom penetration needs to be reviewed. 
This paper examines the current status of USOF and its evolution. Based on this, we develop 
a framework for evaluation of USOF and suggest a way forward.  
 
It has been recognized that telecom services are drivers of economic growth (Waverman, 
Meschi & Fuss, 2005). India has seen significant growth in telecom services in the past few 
years, mostly driven by mobile services. However this growth had been largely limited to 
urban areas. For example, the urban teledensity as of December 31, 2008 was 81.38 per cent, 
whereas, rural teledensity was 12.62 per cent (TRAI 2009).Rural teledensity had not been 
able to keep pace with the spurt in urban teledensity.  This trend was similar in many other 
countries. For example, in Pakistan, as of March 31, 2007, whereas the total teledensity was 
35.7%, rural teledensity was less than 2% (Wilson, 2007). In China, the urban fixed line 
teledensity was 44%, whereas the rural fixed line teledensity was 16% as of 31
st December, 
2006 and the ratio of mobile teledensity between urban and rural areas has been 7:1 (Fong, 
2009). 
The rural context as compared to the urban context is characterized by low population 
densities, large distances between population clusters, and low per capita income.  The first 
two factors lead to a lower potential demand for a given area, due to which the cost of 
creating and maintaining rural telecom infrastructure is expensive. The third factor results in 
lower ability to pay. Therefore, the commercial viability of rural telecom services was low. 
Thus improving RTD was a challenge.  
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Indian Telecom Sector 
The overall policy framework for the Indian telecom sector was provided by the Department 
of Telecom (DoT), under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology.   
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) 
were the two state owned incumbents. MTNL was carved out of DoT in 1986 and BSNL was 
formed with the corporatization of DoT in 2000. MTNL provided services in the metros of 
Delhi and Mumbai. BSNL provided them in the rest of the country.  
Apart from MTNL and BSNL, there were several private operators in various key technology 
and service segments: fixed, mobile, satellite and local, national long distance, international 
etc. The fixed and mobile services were licensed on the basis of service areas called ‘circles’ 
that were administrative units of DoT and later those of BSNL. These were usually co 
terminus with state boundaries. Initially, two mobile private operators per service area had 
been licensed through auctions. They were required to use the GSM standard. Besides the 
state owned incumbents, one private operator per circle could also provide fixed services, by 
participating and winning in the auction. The fixed service license had the requirement that 
operators must provide 10% of their lines in rural areas. However, private operators claimed 
they had bid too high and could not provide services in a commercially viable way. The 
government then came out with a National Telecom Policy, 1999 (NTP 99) that allowed the 
operators to convert their license fee in to a one time entry fee (which was much lower than 
the license fee) and an annual revenue share for the duration of the license. As a part of NTP 
99, each circle could have potentially any number of operators. It also introduced the state 
owned operators, BSNL and MTNL as the third mobile operator in each circle. Subsequently, 
in 2001, the DoT auctioned licenses for the fourth mobile operator, with GSM standard. 
Some of the operators, after acquiring fixed line licenses (whose entry fee) was much lower, 
used the CDMA based Wireless in the Local Loop (WLL) services to provide “limited” 
mobility services. Since the entry fee for fixed services was much lower, operators had a 
business case for giving “mobile like services” at the much lower regulated tariffs for fixed 
services. Moreover, fixed service operators could retain all revenues from long distance 
services, whereas mobile operators were required to pass on 95% of it to DoT/BSNL (they 
could retain 5% to cover bad debts etc). Mobile services operated under Receiving Party Pays 
regime, which limited their ability to influence their subscribers to use their services, whereas 
the WLL with “limited mobility” services operated under the Calling Party Pays regime. In 
order to streamline the provision of WLL with “limited” mobility and mobile services, the  
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DoT came out with the Unified Access Service License (UASL). By shifting to this regime, 
fixed service operators could provide full fledged mobile services, after paying the 
differential in license fee between the fourth cellular and the fixed license fee they had 
already paid. Since mobile operators had no roll out obligations, the DoT allowed the 
migration to UASL for all operators without any roll out obligations. Operators got the 
freedom to choose any standard and Calling Party Pays regime was implemented for all 
operators.  
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), set up in 1997 was the regulatory 
authority mandated with tariff regulation, fixing interconnection terms, quality of services 
etc. The Telecom Dispute Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) was a quasi-judicial 
body that adjudicated and settled disputes between service providers or licensor and licensee 
and reviewed appeals against TRAI directions.  
Telecom Growth: The Urban/Rural Divide 
 
While the overall growth in teledensity had been impressive, it accentuated the gap between 
urban and rural teledensity. The total teledensity of 1.3 per cent as of March 31, 1996 rose to 
33.23 percent by December 31, 2008 (TRAI 2009). In the period between March 31, 2002 
and December 31, 2008, the number of phone subscriptions increased from 44.9 million to 
384.79 million.  However this has been limited to urban areas. For example, the urban 
teledensity as of December 31, 2008 was 81.38 per cent, whereas, rural teledensity was 12.62 
per cent (TRAI 2008). Despite the relatively rapid increase in urban teledensity the increasing 
disparity between urban and rural teledensity was of concern as it implied differential 
economic growth rates. Figure 1 shows the urban, rural and total teledensity, and the growing 
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The impetus to growth, initially in metros and then urban areas, was provided by mobile 
services. As was the trend elsewhere, the fast growth of wireless technologies, especially 
mobile, their reducing cost, increasing consumer demand contributed to their high uptake. 
Increasing purchasing power due to high economic growth rates further accelerated the 
adoption of mobiles in India. Policy and regulatory initiatives, such as the introduction of 
competition (there were 5-7 operators in most service areas), reduction in Access Deficit 
Charges leading to reduction in tariffs and initiatives of private operators in bringing forth 
innovative pricing schemes such as lifetime validity, small recharge coupons ($ 0.25) were 
some factors contributing to this growth. Given the increasing saturation in urban areas, most 
operators had put in place aggressive plans to penetrate beyond urban areas. 
Policy Initiatives to Improve Rural Teledensity  
Since the 1970s, there has been policy focus in providing and improving RTS. Over time, 
these policies and instruments have changed in keeping with the policy and regulatory 
developments in various other parts of the world and included the following: 
a)  Programs for Provision of Village Level Connectivity 
b)  Contribution from Private Operators towards Rural Roll Out 
c)  Access Deficit Charges  
d)  Universal Service Levy (USL) and Creation of USOF  
 
a) Programs for Provision of Village Level Connectivity: The initial objective of various 
policies and programs was to provide a village public telephone (VPT) in each of the 607,491 
villages (This number has been revised to 593,485 based on reclassification necessitated by  
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the changing population profile).  Table1 provides data on the status of implementation 
(VPTs covered from March 31, 1995 -December 31, 2008). It can be seen that until March 
31, 2007, the VPTs added over the previous years was a positive number. However, as of 
March 31, 2008 and December 31, 2008, this is a negative number, indicating that the net 
number of VPTs has decreased. In fact, the number of villages uncovered has increased to 
54,037, larger than in the previous two years. This may indicate an increasing availability of 
other telecom access means, at least in the larger and better connected villages. This could 
have let to non-viability of existing VPTs. This situation also raises the issue of whether the 
USOF should continue to focus on provision, maintenance of VPTs in all villages or should it 
specifically target specific villages? 
                     Table 1: Year Wise Status of Village Connectivity Program 1995-2008 
Status as on  














* 539,448 91.0 -20,055 54,037 
2008 559,503 94.0 -4,572
** 33,982 
2007
*+ 564,075 94.3 15,232 43,416 
2006 548,843 90.5 18,227 58,648 
2005 530,616 87.0 8,269 76,875 
2004 522,347 85.9 8,060 85,228 
2003 514,287 84.6 45,425 94,364 
2002 468,862 77.1 59,940    
2001 408,922 67.3 68,282    
2000  Data Not Available 
1999 340,640 56.0 37,058    
1998 303,582 49.9 42,855    
1997 260,727 42.9 56,719    
1996 204,008 33.6 31,497    
1995  172,511 28.4      
* Data as of December 31, 2008 
** Shows the VPTs that were closed 
*+ The total number of villages changed from 607,491 to 593,485 between June  
30,   2007 to December 31, 2007 possibly due to reclassification 
+ VPT = Village Public Telephone 
 Source - http://www.trai.gov.in/ 
Jain, R. and Raghuram, G. (2005): Report to Department of Telecom on 
“Accelerated Provision of Rural Telecom Services”  
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Contribution from Private Operators towards Rural Roll Out:  With private operators 
licensed to provide telecom services, government envisaged funding support for fixed/fixed 
wireless services from private fixed line operators. They were required to provide 10 per cent 
of their deployments in rural areas. Mobile operators had no such obligations. This was 
possibly because the government viewed mobile services as expensive and hence would not 
be affordable by the poor.  
There was very little contribution on the ground from the private operators. They preferred to 
pay the associated liquidated damages as these were lower than the cost of roll out. With the 
transition to the Unified Access Service License (UASL), a large number of both fixed 
service operators (FSO) and mobile telecom services (CMTS) licensees shifted to UASL. The 
UASL had no associated rural roll out obligations.  
 Access Deficit Charge (ADC): With increasing participation of the private sector, there was 
an explicit need to focus on rural areas. Therefore, TRAI came out with a framework for the 
imposition of ADC to be paid by all operators to fixed service operators (so that they could 
spread services in rural areas), in 2003. This framework that became operational from 
February 1, 2004 reflected the government perspective that rural services would be provided 
using fixed/fixed wireless services. This was supposed to compensate fixed line operators for 
the regulated, below cost rentals and call charges, especially in rural areas. Since BSNL was 
the dominant fixed line operator, by far, it became the major recipient of such payments 
TRAI initially estimated ADC based on an “affordability” criteria i.e., the difference between 
the regulated prices, both rentals and call charges (at levels TRAI thought was affordable to 
rural customers) and BSNL’s cost estimation of service provision over its entire network.  
The ADC thus calculated was nearly 30% of the sector revenue, leading to perceived high 
additional cost per call. Since initially ADC was applicable only on calls that originated, 
transited or terminated in a fixed network, the relative cost of mobile to mobile calls became 
cheaper, resulting in sudden spurt in growth of mobile services. To remove this ‘distortion’, 
ADC was subsequently extended to cover all types of calls, resulting in a reduction on 
reducing the per minute applicable charges as compared to the previous scenario, as the total 
minutes available over which ADC could be allocated became larger. Given the perceived 
high charges and complexities of assessing ADC, such as variation by type of call (fixed to 
mobile, mobile to mobile etc, local, long distance, and international) differences in distance  
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slabs etc, ADC underwent a series of reviews. Over time the ADC component was reduced to 
10% of the sector revenue and attempts were made to simplify the regime. 
There were a number of operational difficulties (Jain, 2006)  which led to reviewing the 
then current ADC regime. In 2005, TRAI gave recommendation for implementing a lower 
priced ADC regime on a per call basis but added a revenue share of 1.5 per cent payable to 
BSNL by all operators from March 1, 2006.  Subsequently TRAI phased out the ADC 
regime, by removing the per minute call charges and progressively reducing the revenue 
share towards ADC to zero from April 1, 2008.  Further, TRAI recommended that BSNL’s 
rural obligations should be supported through the USOF through a Universal Service Levy 
(USL). 
Universal Service Obligation Fund: USOF came in to effect from April 1, 2002. It was 
created as a non lapsable fund. Transfers from the USOF required parliamentary approvals.   
The USOF was to be administered by the Administrator, USOF, DoT.  All operators were 
required to contribute five per cent of the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) towards USL. 
Table 2 gives the collections and disbursements from the USOF from 2002 onwards and also 
shows the allocations for fixed/fixed wireless connectivity from 2002-03 to 2008-09.   
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Table 2: Collection and Disbursement from USOF and Allocations for Fixed/Fixed Wireless Connectivity from 2002-03 to 2008-09 
Status of USOF As On 30.09.2008                                                                                                                                           (Rs. Million) 
Sr.  No.  Particulars  2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 Grand  Total 
Aggregate Data 
1  Funds Collected  16,536 21,432 34,577 35,333 42,111 54,055    204,044 
2 Funds  Allotted  3,000 2,000 13,146 17,669 15,000 12,900 3,521 67,235 
3 Total  Spent  3,000 2,000 13,146 17,669 15,000 12,900 3,521 67,235 
4  Total Funds Remaining                       9,599 
Break up of Amount Spent by Activity                                                                                                                 (Amount in Rs. Million) 
1   Amount on O&M of VPTs  2,366 664 651 834 815 1,189 341 6,861 
   Percentage of the total spent  79 335550     
2   Amount on Replacement of VPTs  634 46 721 1,082 1,062 2,569 743 6,857 
   Percentage of the total spent  2126671     
3   Amount on Rural Community Phone  NA NA NA 319 417 197 41 974 
   Percentage of the total spent        2 3 3     
4  Amount on VPTs in Uncovered villages  NA NA NA 297 554 447 69 1,368 
   Percentage of the total spent        2 4 4     
5  Amount on Rural DELs (Prior to 
01.04.02) 
NA 1,290 10,628 NA NA NA NA 11,918 
   Percentage of the total spent    65 81           
6  Amount on Rural DELs installed from 
01.04.02 to 31.03.05 
NA NA 1,146 13,934 3,427 1,221 251 19,980 
   Percentage of the total spent      9 79 23 11     
7  Amount on Rural DELs installed after 
01.04.05 
NA NA NA 1,201 8,724 7,277 1,052 18,254 
   Percentage of the total spent        7 58 82     
Note: “NA” indicates that the agreement for the respective USO activities were not signed during this period  
Source – http://www.dot.gov.in/uso/implementationstatus.htm  
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USOF Framework 
USOF was designed to be implemented initially as two streams Stream I and II focusing on 
fixed and fixed wireless covering both public and private services. Amendments were made 
to the Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Act in 2006 and the USOF rules that paved the way 
for inclusion of provision of mobile services (Stream III) (TRAI, 2005).  Later, streams IV, 
V and VI were added to cover provision of broadband connectivity to villages in a phased 
manner, creation of general infrastructure in rural and remote areas for development of 
telecommunication facilities and induction of new technological developments in the 
telecom sector in rural and remote areas respectively.  
Design 
The USOF framework design comprised of the following elements: 
1.  Viability Gap Funding: The USOF provided for viability gap funding on the basis of 
net cost, being the difference between the sum of annualized capital and annual 
operating cost and annual revenue for all its schemes.  
2.  Competitive Selection of Operators: The winning bidders for any program were to be 
selected through a multi-layered bidding process on the least quoted subsidy support 
basis. UASL, fixed and cellular service providers were eligible for bidding in their 
service areas for services and entities registered as infrastructure providers could bid 
only for infrastructure provision for stream III. 
3.  Auction Design: Multi-layered “Informed Descending Auction” was designed to 
select bidders (both for infrastructure and service provision) who qualified for 
subsidy over three rounds of bidding. A starting benchmark or reserve price for the 
bid amount was specified in the first round. In each of the two remaining subsequent 
round, the bidders had to quote a subsidy amount less than or equal to the 
benchmark, which was the smallest amount bid in the earlier round.  
4.  Support for Both Public and Private Services: The USOF provided support for 
provision of public and private services.  
Since very little progress had been made in Streams IV, V and VI, we present the analysis 
based on data from the first three streams.  
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Scope 
i.  Stream-I: This covered villages with a population exceeding 2000 for provision 
of public telecom and information services. The funding provided for operation 
and maintenance support of all VPTs in the villages, replacement of non-
functional VPTs, installation of additional VPTs (Rural Community Phones) in 
villages with population of more than 2,000, up-gradation of a public telephone 
to public tele information centers, installation of high speed public telecom 
information centers in a public place at block headquarters.  
ii.  Stream-II: In the first phase, that had been operationalized to date, it covered 
capital and operational support for household telephones in, 1685 or nearly two 
thirds of the total rural and remote sub districts. The support was to be provided 
until ADC could cover the differences in rentals prescribed by TRAI and those 
actually charged for lines that were installed prior to April 1, 2002. After phasing 
out of ADC, from April 1, 2008, support would be provided for a further period 
of three years. 
iii. Stream III: Provided support for mobile services in those rural and remote areas 
which had no existing fixed wireless or mobile service. In the first phase, it 
involved setting up and managing 7,871 infrastructure sites spread over 500 
districts. These sites constituted 81 clusters. To date, this was the largest program 
under this phase. 
There were two parts: Part A involved providing the infrastructure. Both telecom 
service providers and infrastructure providers (including those who did not have a 
telecom license but were registered as Infrastructure Providers (IP-I)) and Part B 
envisaged using the provided infrastructure by three competitively selected 
service providers (“Universal Service Providers” (USPs) who were existing 
UASL holders).  This allowed the costs of the expensive infrastructure to be kept 
low through sharing. Part B supported for the installation of BTS, batteries and 
power plants, associated antennas and backhaul and other equipment for 
provisioning of mobile services. Initially, the infrastructure created was to be 
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This stream had been designed with the following elements: 
a)  Identification of a Cluster: Bidding was designed on the basis of clusters (a 
group of districts within a service area that had the same benchmark 
(explained below)). Each cluster would contain a number of infrastructure 
sites. Benchmark was calculated based on the technology used for the BTS 
and the estimated cost of providing the infrastructure and was same for all the 
infrastructure sites within a cluster.  
b)  Location of Towers: The location and the number of towers required in each 
district were identified based on GIS maps indicating existing towers, 
population density and availability of fixed wireline/wireless connections. 
c)  Rollout Time Frame: Part A providers had to commission at least 50 per cent 
of the infrastructure sites in the service area within eight months period and 
the remaining ones within 12 months of the signing of the agreement. USPs 
had to provide the mobile services within two months of the commissioning 
of the infrastructure site by the IP. 
Further details of stream III are provided in Appendix 2. 
Outcomes of Streams I and II: As of March 31, 2007, the end of the envisaged 
implementation period, there were gaps in the targets for Stream I (Table 2). For 
stream II, BSNL was selected in more than 75% of the sub districts for service 
provisioning with the remaining going to the private sector 
(www.dot.gov.in/uso//implementationstatus.htl accessed on May 6, 2009). There 
were no specific targets to be achieved. However, there was a cap of Rs 20,000 
that USOF would support from April 1, 2008 for three years for lines installed 
prior to April 1, 2002. 
Outcomes of Stream III 
Bidding Process 
Part A: There were 21 bidders of which only seven won. BSNL became the 
largest infrastructure provider, by winning the bid in 63 of the 81 clusters it had 
bid for. The maximum number of bidders in any cluster was 11 and the minimum 
was four, indicating competition for the bids. Table 3 provides details on the state 
wise number of clusters and the bidding outcomes.  
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Reduction in the 
Winning Bid 
with respect to 
Benchmark 
      No No  No Rs Rs Rs  Million %
1 Andhra  Pradesh  6 581 7.3 397,038 189,685 120 52.2
2 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
1 62 5 517,041 202,316 20 60.9
3  Assam   1 90 8 441,777 249 000 17 43.6
4 Bihar    5 489 9 415,349 78,520 165 81.1
5 Chhattisgarh  5 560 6.6 389,085 145,222 139 62.8
6 Gujarat    1 66 6 412,320 73,198 22 82.2
7 Haryana  1 14 7 404,211 71,738 5 82.3
8 Himachal 
Pradesh 
3 295 5 385,606 120,374 78 68.9
9 Jammu  & 
Kashmir 
2 178 4 436,635 189,733 44 56.4
10 Jharkhand  3 305 8.7 401,522 100,737 91 74.8
11 Karnataka  4 427 10 373,994 99,943 117 73.3
12 Kerala  1 46 6 394,946 98,700 14 75
13 Madhya  Pradesh  10 985 9.1 385,022 68,284 312 82.3
14 Maharashtra    9 1,017 10.4 404,895 103,851 305 74.4
15 Manipur  1 95 5 609,201 212,185 38 65.2
16 Meghalaya  1 102 7 465,314 223,299 25 52
17 Mizoram  1 71 7 572,233 274,599 21 52 
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Reduction in the 
Winning Bid 
with respect to 
Benchmark 
      No No  No Rs Rs Rs  Million %
18 Nagaland  1 56 5 609,201 212,185 22 65.2
19 Orissa  4 432 10 400,423 96,168 131 76
20 Punjab    1 13 7 400,140 67,004 4 83.3
21 Rajasthan  4 411 8.5 389,136 111,820 114 71.3
22 Sikkim    1 8 6 477,413 162,321 3 66
23 Tamil  Nadu  4 371 9.8 424,181 71,065 131 83.2
24 Tripura  1 147 5 537,317 255,912 41 52.4
25 Uttaranchal  2 217 5 442,277 142,035 65 67.7
26 Uttar  Pradesh  6 666 9.2 404,557 129,035 183 68.2
27  West Bengal   2 167 9 401,105 67,168 56 83.3
   Overall 81 7,871   440,442 141,337 2,283 68.7
Source: www.dot.gov.in and Authors’ Analysis 
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The multi round auction process where successive benchmarks were lower ensured 
that the final actual subsidy to be paid by the government was 68.7 per cent less than 
the estimated benchmark value. The total amount of subsidy “saved” was Rs 2283 
million annually for five years, being the difference in amount between the total 
benchmark costs and the total bid amounts. 
Part B: There were 18 bidders of which 12 won. The bidding was competitive, with 
an average of eight bidders in the first and five in the second round (Jain and 
Raghuram, 2008). Table 4 provides state wise data on the bidding outcomes. The total 
subsidy “saved” was Rs 1,484 million. Only bidders in the six hill states in the North 
East part of the country sought subsidy from the government.  Even here, the 
reduction from the benchmark was 50.0 per cent, showing a “saving” of Rs 76 million 
from the benchmark price. Bidders in six states sought zero subsidy from the 
government. Here, the reduction from the benchmark was 100.0 per cent, showing a 
saving of Rs 158 million from the benchmark price. Bidders in clusters in 16 states 
were willing to take negative subsidy. The overall reduction in subsidy sought was 
104.0 per cent. The total amount of subsidy “saved” being the difference in the 
benchmark and the winning bid over all the cluster was Rs 1250 million annually.   
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Table 4: State Wise Data on Bidding Outcomes 
Sr. 
No. 
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      No No No Rs Rs  Rs  Million Percent
Clusters in which Winning Bidders Sought Negative Subsidy from the Government 
1 
Andhra 
Pradesh 18(6)  581 6 128,421 -13  -75
100
2 Assam    3(1)  90 4 185,224 -18,320  -18 109.9
3 Bihar    15(5)  489 6 181,345 -123  -88 100.1
4 Chhattisgarh 15(5)  560 4 259,516 -12  -145 100
5 Gujarat    3(1)  66 5 179,589 -12  -12 100
6 Haryana  3(1)  14 5 131,577 -12  -2 100
7 Jharkhand  9(3)  305 6 243,022 -17,292  -80 107.1
8 Karnataka  12(4)  427 5 180,977 -21,016  -86 111.6
9 
Madhya 
Pradesh 30(10)  985 4 212,346 -13  -210
100
10 Maharashtra  27(9) 1,017 5 184,105 -12  -189 100
11 Orissa  12(4)  432 5 205,286 -5,146  -92 102.5
12 Punjab    3(1)  13 4 117,963 -20,996  -2 117.8
13 Rajasthan  9(4)  294 5 148,569 -21,018  -50 114.1
14 Tamil  Nadu  12(4)  371 6 136,725 -124  -51 100.1 
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Sr. 
No. 
















per Site       
Average 
Winning 
















Bengal   6(2)  167 7 182,547 -15  -31
100
   Overall  195(66)  6477 5 177,987    -1,250* 104
Clusters in which Winning Bidders Sought Subsidy from the Government 
1 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
3(1) 62 3 291,741 145,870  9 50
2 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 6(2)  178 3 215,774 107,887  19 50
3 Manipur  3(1)  95 3 304,820 152,410  14 50
4 Meghalaya  3(1)  102 3 298,690 149,345  15 50
5 Mizoram  3(1)  71 3 319,517 159,758  11 50
6 Nagaland  3(1)  56 3 222,631 111,315  6 50
   Total   21(7)  564 3 275,529 137,764 76* 50
Clusters in which Winning Bidders Sought Zero Subsidy from the Government 
1 
Himachal 
Pradesh 9(3)  295 3 296,656 96,560    87 100
2 Kerala  3(1)  46 5 104,469 0  5 100
3 Rajasthan  3(4)  117 4 228,755 216,999  27 100
4 Sikkim    3(1)  8 4 188,840 0  2 100
5 Tripura  3(1)  147 3 228,500 0  34 100 
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Sr. 
No. 
















per Site       
Average 
Winning 










6 Uttaranchal  6(2)  217 5 182,025 168,612  3  
   Total   27(12)  830 4 204,874 80,362  158* 100
Overall 
  
243 7,871 4 219,463 109,063  1,484 85
Source: www.dot.gov.in and Authors’ Analysis  
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Implementation: However as of September 2008 (Table 5), there were significant gaps 
in implementation, notably from BSNL, that had fulfilled only nearly 13% of the 
target infrastructure sites. This resulted in an overall completion percentage of only 
25%. 



















1 GTL  421 390 5.3  0.93
2 QTIL  88 88 1.1  1.00
3 Vodafone  331 262 4.2  0.79
4 Reliance  472 251 6  0.53
5 KEC  384 153 4.9  0.40
6 BSNL  6,175 790 78.5  0.13
   Total 7,871 1,934 100  0.25
                Source - http://www.dot.gov.in/uso/implementationstatus.htm   
It can be seen that only QTIL that had been awarded 1.1% of all towers had 
completed commissioning of its awarded towers. BSNL which had been awarded 
nearly 78.5% of the towers had completed only13.5% of towers. Without substantial 
roll out of Part A, Part B outcomes were limited. 
Implications 
Despite this slow progress in the roll out of Phase 1 of USOF, there has been a 
significant increase in from 1.86% in March 31, 2006 to 9.34% by March 31, 2008 
and further to 12.62% by December 2008. Obviously, USOF support had very little 
contribution on this account.  
A large part of the growth was due to competitive and market pressures which 
operators faced. With an economic boom, operators reached significant penetration 
levels in urban areas and found it increasingly difficult to get more urban customers 
and thus focused on penetration in rural areas. Further, a reduction in handset charges 
to sub $20 level, could have contributed to faster adoption in rural areas, especially  
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those that were close to urban areas.   
A significant role was played by the regulatory changes brought about by a 
continuous reduction in ADC, leading to reduction in the market efficiency gap 
(Navas-Sabater et al, 2001; Malik and de Silva, 2005), and a competitive 
environment, led to operators reducing call charges., facilitating penetration.  
  
 The increase in RTD is currently probably concentrated in rural areas around urban 
centres and highways. The customer, who buys a mobile handset in rural areas, is 
more likely to be relatively higher earning member, as cost of handset is a major 
deterrent to acquisition of a phone. Cost of calls and complexity of tariff plans have 
been cited as other deterrents (Sarin and Jain, 2009).   
   
This shows that the USOF, per se, was not effective in the spread of RTD, but rather 
the reduction in ADC and competition, coupled with growth in the economy leading 
to higher disposable incomes including for rural areas, and falling handset prices that 
has led to increase in RTD.  
Further, the delays in rolling out the planned projects, has led to concerns regarding 
the efficacy of the current organizational mechanisms in dealing with schedule and 
contract adherence with respect to roll outs. While this could be attributed to gaps in 
monitoring, we believe this is due to the  larger issue regarding the relationship 
between the USOF and BSNL. BSNL is a wholly government owned entity under the 
Secretary, DoT and the USOF administrator also reports to Secretary DoT. This lack 
of independence could lead to a situation where lax oversight could result due to 
relatedness of the two units.  
A Framework for Assessing the Indian Experience 
The Indian experience is analyzed following a project life cycle approach covering: Scope, 
Identification of Universal Access Provider, Mechanism to Fund the USOF, Selection 
Process, Extent of Involvement of Private Sector, Outcomes, and Review Mechanisms.  
Scope: (i) Type of Services: The dominant focus had been on voice provision. Initially, the 
approach was to support this and include Internet access through fixed and fixed wireless  
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only. Subsequently, the scope was enhanced to include mobile services. While this was in 
line with developments in other countries where scope of USOF services included mobile 
services (Uganda, India) (Gasmi, 2005), the delays in incorporation of wireless in the scope 
of USOF possibly led to delays in increase of RTD. Additionally, the role of broadband and 
Internet in economic growth has triggered a review of the scope of universal access provision 
(as for example in Brazil, Mexico, India) (Jayakar and Sawhney, 2004).  
After incorporating wireless services, the scope needs to be extended to provision of 
information services through mobiles. For this, a number of initiatives from the government 
such as wireless enablement of government websites would need to be undertaken, as people 
in rural areas are often dependent on government agencies for several services. A number of 
value added services such as mobile banking could then piggy back on the service 
infrastructure so created.  
On another dimension, while the Indian USOF did envisage Internet access, its focus 
continued to be on voice as brought out by the little progress made in Streams IV, V and VI 
and that allotted amounts were almost totally spent on Stream I, II and III that predominantly 
focus on voice connectivity (Table 2).  
 (ii) Target Population:  The focus of mobile coverage has been rural areas, as nearly 72% 
of the population is resident there. However, there is a need to focus on urban poor as well. 
The importance of the urban sector has been growing rapidly and despite the fact that only 
28% of India’s 1.2 billion people currently live in cities, this proportion is rising. What’s 
more, the urban sector contributes to more than 60% to India’s GDP – a far greater than the 
29% urban share in 1950-51. The rate at which India has been urbanizing has been 
increasing and by 2025, 40% of India’s population is projected to be urban (National 
Institute of Urban Affairs, 2000). Furthermore, between 1983 and 2004-05, the total 
numbers of rural poor declined by more than 12% while the total number of urban poor 
increased by nearly 14%. USOF in most countries have focused on rural areas.  The issue of 
identifying beneficiaries and ensuring that they are the ones who actually use it is difficult 
for mobile phones, unlike a fixed line phone that can be made available at a fixed location 
and thus limits the people who can use it. 
 
(iii) Elements of Services Covered: The USOF provided for viability gap funding for 
infrastructure and services, but no subsidy was provided for handsets, a major barrier to  
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mobile ownership, (Sarin and Jain, 2009). Despite the rapid fall in handset prices, its cost 
continues to be the primary barrier to owning a mobile in the urban slums. There have been 
few examples of bundling subsidies of network with handsets. Stream III is thus “coverage” 
based, in the sense, that it provides support for connectivity in rural areas, rather than support 
to individuals. It is thus not a targeted subsidy.  
 
(iv) Conceptualizing the Scope vis-à-vis Scale of Funding:  One of the criticisms against the 
current model of USOF is the inability of the DoT to develop mechanisms to deploy the 
funds. It can be seen from Table 2 that there is a significant amount in the USOF which 
remains to be utilized.  A massive roll out plan, rather than limiting to identified clusters, 
world class management expertise for managing schedule and deliverable adherence, support 
for backbone infrastructure could have led to more visible outcomes.  
If the DoT did not have an adequate plan for utilizing USOF, it could have reduced the 
revenue share percentage that service providers contribute to it. This could have allowed 
them to provide lower priced calls, thus facilitating greater penetration. On the other hand, 
since the USOF is deposited in the Consolidated Fund of India and disbursements are made 
by prior approval of the parliament, the Ministry of Finance may use its discretion for 
utilizing the funds for a variety of purposes taking away the independence of USOF.  
Given the increase in RTD without any substantial support from USOF, there has been some 
debate whether there is a need for USOF?  Our contention is that while so far, market forces 
have ensured faster penetration than the USOF, these may not be as effective, when there 
would be a need to penetrate in the more remote and rural areas. The growth in RTD has 
largely been in near urban areas and larger villages, where the cost of service provision is 
lower and ability to pay may be higher, making these services relatively more commercially 
viable than those in the more remote regions. Also, with the likely introduction of 3G 
services, operators are likely to focus in urban areas. Thus the USOF is required so as to 
maintain a sustained focus on rural areas, besides ensuring that specific areas (remote, north 
east regions) are covered. 
To get a perspective on the magnitude of the amounts required to increase RTD, we estimate 
that it requires nearly $ one billion to increase RTD by one per cent.  ((0.01 * 823 million 
rural population * Rs 5000 cost per line)/Rs 40 (dollar to rupee conversion rate)), whereas the 
unspent amount in USOF as of September was nearly $3 billion. Given the increasing and  
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large gap between UTD and RTD, this indicates that there is a need to continue with USOF, 
even though market forces play a significant role in increasing RTD. However, since the 
absolute unspent amount appears huge, the public perception could turn against USOF, 
making it difficult to sustain contributions. Therefore, it is necessary for USOF to come out 
with high impact, high visibility programs that have quick results. 
A possible constraint in conceptualizing high impact, large sized programs could be the lack 
of autonomy that USOF Administrator has with respect to disbursements from the USOF. 
The USOF is not ring fenced. It is a part of the Consolidated Fund of India, and requires 
approvals from the Ministry of Finance for spending. Policy makers must move towards ring 
fencing it. 
Identification of Universal Access Provider: Universal access had traditionally been treated 
as the obligations of the incumbent. However, with open market entry especially in mobile 
services in most countries, the issue of who should bear these obligations has increasingly 
involved private sector (Jain 2004; Jain and Raghuram 2005; Wellenius, 2002).   In several 
countries, incumbent operators continue to be the universal access provider as in Australia 
and UK   
In developing countries, since USOF initiatives gained significance almost in parallel with 
rapid take-off of mobile services, and since mobile services have generally involved 
competitive service provision and included private players, there is a rationale for involving 
them in USO (Chile, India, Uganda (Gasmi, 2005)). Involvement of the private sector was 
done with a view to bring in reduced costs of service provision, and higher efficiencies.  
While ADC usually payable to the incumbent had been traditionally used to improve RTD, 
there were problems with this approach, in India as it led to the incumbent operator becoming 
the major recipient of ADC (due to the extensive nature of the existing network).  Further, in 
the absence of accounting separation at the incumbent, and no framework to control the 
scope/extent of activities, there was no or little review of the rural obligations actually 
fulfilled by BSNL from the ADC. Besides ADC created ‘perverse’ incentives, in that since it 
was non-transparent, all operators who contributed to ADC were subsidizing the incumbent. 
In a competitive situation, this was untenable. An ADC regime and implementing it for two 
years, it was replaced by USOF. This is a ‘cleaner’ and better targeted instrument with 
visibility for outcomes (Jain, 2006, Jain and Raghuram, 2005). Over time, ADCs are being  
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phased out as they create inappropriate disincentives (Jain, 2004; Jain 2006; Malik and de 
Silva, 2005; Noll and Wallsten, 2006; http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/index.html 
accessed on April 24, 2009). 
More than 60% of the countries that responded to the ITU survey for the ITU World 
Regulatory Database had adopted the USO approach by 2007 (Figure 2) having moved from 
a variety of sources for funding rural obligations .  The contributions to this fund come from a 
variety of sources that vary across different countries.  
Figure 2: Prevalence of Different Approaches to Universal Service Funding 2001-2007  
 
 
Source: ITU World Regulatory Database, Excerpted from ICTregulation toolkit 
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/Section.3143.html 
 
Another issue that is important to address is the relationship of the USOF Administrator or 
manager to the players responsible for implementing USOF programs. These need to be 
independent of each other in order to ensure accountability. The USOF administrator should 
be made accountable for outcomes. This will ensure that USOF programs are implemented as 
per schedule and target. 
Selection Process: The selection process for service providers (including both public and 
private service and infrastructure providers) was based on competitive viability gap funding 
mechanism. This allowed the amount of subsidy to be provided to be substantially brought  
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down. This method has now been adopted in many countries and reflects the best practices 
(Cannock, 2001; Wellenius, 2002; Gillwald, 2005) 
Extent of Involvement of Private Sector: The role of the private sector was limited to the 
implementation of the project. In Chile, private operators were allowed to select project sites 
and the final selection was made on the lowest amount bid (Wellenius, 2002).  An example of 
a context in which greater role for private sector in India is the case of Gujarat where the PPP 
framework for infrastructure sector provides for a private operator to propose a particular 
project. The government then invites public bids for the same project. If the proposing bidder 
has a lower bid or can match the lowest bid, then the proposing entity is awarded the bid, 
otherwise, it gets a compensation for developing the proposal and the lowest bidder gets the 
project. The private operator’s selection of site leads to commercially more efficient choices. 
Therefore, within a specified geographic area that is DoT’s priority, private operators could 
be involved in site selection.  
Although there had been earlier attempts at involving the private sector in USO provision, 
they had not been very successful, possibly because of the mismatch between the private 
sector’s assessment of costs and the penalties imposed by the government. Limiting the 
technologies and service providers to fixed/fixed wireless increased the costs and reduced the 
incentives for private sector. The use of mobile technologies has increased the incentives for 
the private sector and competition for service has allowed the government to discover prices. 
The bidding process showed that market forces can determine which projects really need 
subsidy and how much. In a competitive environment, small subsidies could give tremendous 
leverage.  
Outcomes and Review Mechanisms: India has moved very quickly in operationalizing a 
regulatory framework that could dramatically increase rural coverage. However,   a lot would 
need to be done both by the DoT and the private operators for this to happen. Bundling in 
handset costs, installation charges etc with service charges could make the rural services 
more “accessible”. Operators have already low cost handsets and sachet size recharge 
coupons (0.25$) in urban areas, which they could extend to rural areas.  
As stated earlier, despite the elaborate framework, the contributions from USOF towards 
increasing RTD have been very little. Given the growth, in the mobile sector, DoT could have 
sought a more active role for the private operators, including in conceptualizing the  
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framework and its implementation. On its side, DoT needed to be able to enforce contracts, 
develop quick and early feedback and review mechanisms, both of which were missing. 
Third party assessments of the effectiveness of USOF programs would have facilitated early 
review and better monitoring of programs. 
Conclusions 
This paper outlined India’s experience of increasing rural telecom services, including its 
recent policy initiative to increase penetration through creation of a Universal Service 
Obligation Fund (USOF).  An analysis of USOF’s largest and most ambitious  program for 
mobile provisioning in rural areas showed that despite the innovative design, it had little 
impact on increasing rural teledensity. The lack of accountability arising from the 
relationship between the government owned incumbent and the USOF administrator, and no 
proper evaluation of USOF, the non-ring fencing of the fund and poor quality project 
management contributed to the slow progress. Lack of involvement of private operators at an 
early stage, inability to suitable enforce any penalties for violation of contracts, and non-
existent review and feedback mechanism have not allowed USOF to leverage the benefits of 
an early start.  Without this operational framework, the strategic elements of design could not 
provide the value that was envisaged. 
Since USOF is a highly visible program, an important aspect in its management is the ability 
to conceptualize for large impact programs as poor or limited conceptualization could lead to 
adverse public opinion against it. The consequence could be a depletion or reduction in the 
role/scope of USOF.   
Positive policy steps that reduced the costs for service provision (revenue shares, duties, 
ADC) and competition facilitated greater penetration.  A judicious combination of USOF 
support and market mechanism could accelerate mobile services in rural areas. 
The Indian USOF model has been analyzed in terms of Scope, Identification of Universal 
Access Provider, Mechanism to Fund the USOF, Selection Process, Extent of Involvement of 
Private Sector, and Outcomes and Review Mechanisms. These aspects were compared with 
the experience of different countries.  
By specifically including mobile and other new technologies, the DoT has worked out a 
mechanism for roll out and disbursals, that is worth emulating by other administrations. It  
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takes into account the potential for widespread usage of wireless technologies, especially 
mobile services for a rural context. On the other hand, several other key policy initiatives and 
operational aspects of various programs need to go hand in hand to increase RTD. USOF 
must be treated as one among many instruments for increasing RTD and efforts should be 
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Appendix 1: Various National Programs for Village Level Connectivity 
Long Distance Telephone Program (1970s): It had the target for provision of public phone 
within 5 km of any habitation. However, while this policy addressed the spread of telecom 
through targets for coverage of geographical area, the program implementation was in terms 
of covering villages.  
Village Public Telephone (VPT) (1970s): The scheme envisaged provision of public phone in 
each one of the nearly 0.6 million village panchayats (administrative units).  
North Eastern Regional Program (NERP)/Tribal Sub Plan (TSP) (1989): From the Ninth 
Five Year Plan onwards, the NE region, being a “sensitive border area,” was treated as a 
special focus area. TSP was formulated in 1989 for all round and faster deployment of 
telecom facilities in tribal areas.  
The National Telecom Policy, 1994 (NTP, 1994):  Aimed to cover all villages by 1997. 
During the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97), the aim was to provide 0.309 million VPTs 
(covering half of the total number of villages) by 1997. These targets were revised by NTP 94 
to cover all villages with a VPT by March 1997 on the assumption that the private sector 
would significantly contribute to the effort. However, by March 31, 1997, 0.30 million 
villages remained uncovered.  
The Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002): Had the objective of providing universal and easy 
accessibility for rural telecommunications. It was envisaged that the remaining 0.301 million 
villages would be covered jointly by the DoT and the private sector. Of this, DoT was to 
provide 0.239 million VPTs. Emphasizing the importance of rural connectivity, the plan 
envisaged that any shortfalls from the private sector would be made up by the government.  
By March 1999, only a total of 0.310 million villages were covered. The participation by the 
private sector did not take off in any significant manner and DoT’s efforts were limited to the 
resources it had. Paucity of funds and delay in supply of equipment were cited as reasons for 
this gap [Ninth Five Year Plan, Vol 2].  
The New Telecom Policy, 1999 (NTP, 1999): Set 2002 as the target year for covering all 
villages with not only voice but also low speed data services. It set a target of rural 
teledensity of 4 percent, from the then current value of 0.4%, and total village connectivity by  
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2002, coverage of rural, remote and hilly areas as well the reliability of transmission media. It 
recommended setting up the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF). 
Appendix 2: Details of Stream III: Agreement between IP and USP: The DoT proposed to 
enter into agreement with IPs and USPs for provision of mobile services. IPs and USPs were 
to mutually discuss the suitability of the location of the infrastructure site for installation of 
the towers and provision of the mobile services.  
Tariffs: Service providers were mandated to charge tariffs as per TRAI tariff orders or the 
prevailing tariffs of the incumbent fixed line service operator whichever was lower.  
Mechanism for Monitoring Implementation:  Liquidated damages were to be paid by 
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